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Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) are deployed to control critical infrastructure in many 
fields, including industry and manufacturing. In recent years, CPS have been affected 
by cyberattacks due to the increased connectivity of these systems to the Internet. This 
work aims to develop a deep learning-based Intrusion Detection System (IDS) for 
detecting cyberattacks on CPS using multimodal learning techniques. This thesis 
reports the design, implementation, and evaluation of two IDS solutions based on 
different deep learning networks: Convolution Neural Network (CNN) and Recurrent 
Neural Network (RNN). For the first IDS, Gramian Angular Field (GAF) is used to 
convert CPS time-series data to images that are fed to a 3D CNN to train the attack 
detection classifier. The second IDS uses RNN with a multimodal attention approach 
for training the attack detector. Both solutions utilize CPS process data and network 
data to improve the attack detection accuracy. The performance of the proposed 
approaches is evaluated on SWaT datasets collected from a testbed that represents real-
world CPS. Experimental results demonstrate that both IDSs achieved improved 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) are composed of interconnected physical and 
cyber elements to monitor and control critical physical processes in different areas [1]. 
Some of the main application fields of CPS are healthcare, manufacturing, industry, 
and transportation. Historically, these systems were designed to operate at physically 
isolated locations on proprietary hardware and software. CPS encompasses different 
control systems, including supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems 
and programable logic control (PLC). Figure 1 illustrates the basic operations of 
industrial CPS according to NIST's Industrial Control Systems Security Guide [2].  At 
the bottom layer of the architecture are the control loops that utilize sensing and 
actuation components to directly control and manipulate the process. The sensors and 
actuators are connected to PLCs, where the control algorithms are implemented. The 
PLCs receive and interpret the sensors' signals. Then, based on the control algorithm 
and the target set points, they send back the required values to the actuators to adjust 
the process to the desired state. At the top level, there are the Human Machine Interfaces 
(HMIs) and the maintenance facilities. The operators use the HMIs to monitor and 
control the process via the PLCs as well as configuring and maintaining the control 





Figure 1: Industrial CPS operation [2]. 
 
Recently, with the evolution in information and communications technology 
(ICT), these systems have been increasingly connected to corporate networks using 
standard protocols and hardware/software components to reduce cost and to allow 
remote monitoring and control. However, despite the great functionalities that this 
connectivity provides, it introduces new challenges in operating these systems and 
exposes them to vulnerabilities. Also, since the adapted technologies are coming from 
different vendors, new weaknesses have emerged that may cause the system's failures. 
Furthermore, many of the industrial communication protocols that have been used for 
communication between the different devices in the control network lack security 
mechanisms such as encryption and integrity [3]. Due to these vulnerabilities, intruders 
can target the system with cyber-attacks to gain unauthorized access to the control 
network and cause disturbances in the physical process. In the last decade, several 
sophisticated malware targeted industrial infrastructures, such as the Stuxnet worm that 
hit  Iran's nuclear infrastructure in 2010 and the Shamoon virus that targeted the Saudi 




Gas company and hit its computer systems forcing the network to be offline for days 
[5]. 
Due to the severe consequences that such attacks may cause on the society, 
environment, and economy, security mechanisms are essential for CPS to ensure the 
stable operation of the process and avoid the catastrophic impacts of cyberattacks. Fault 
diagnosis systems, which detect any deviations between the actual and a simulated 
process, are not sufficient for security protection in CPS and need to be combined with 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) for effective protection. IDS have been widely 
investigated for monitoring CPS security and for detecting cyber-attacks. According to 
the National Infrastructure Security Coordination Centre (NISCC), firewalls and IDS 
are recommended for SCADA systems and control networks to monitor the system 
processes and network traffic [6].  
IDS provides a protection layer for CPS by monitoring and analyzing the 
system's events to spot any signs of abnormality. The system's behavior should be 
continuously monitored to ensure the system's stable operation at the physical and 
network levels. Modeling the behavior of industrial processes accurately is a very 
challenging and time-consuming process that requires a deep understanding of the 
underlying process and its implementation details. Also, the IDS built to model an 
industrial process usually cannot be generalized for usage with other processes. 
Recently, to overcome these limitations, several CPS datasets have been created to 
enable the learning of complex models and behavior-based IDS using data mining 
techniques. Additionally, deep learning has been widely used for handling high-
dimensional data and extracting better feature representations.  
Multiple research efforts considered the design of IDS for CPS; however, most 




layer or the physical layer. Since CPS are multilayer systems, the cyber-attack effect 
can be seen at one or multiple layers. Thus, deploying an IDS that considers the data 
from the different layers and different data sources across the CPS would enhance the 
detection accuracy. In this thesis, two different IDS are designed and developed using 
deep multimodal learning techniques that combine CPS process data and network data.  
1.1. Problem Statement 
CPS controls critical industrial infrastructure; therefore, any cyberattacks 
targeting these systems may cause catastrophic economic and social impacts if no 
proper protection mechanisms are applied. Thus, IDS is usually deployed to monitor 
the system's behavior to detect abnormal behaviors. For CPS, model-based IDS 
solutions are widely considered by modeling the behavior of the system. For example, 
in [7], the normal behavior of the CPS is modeled using multiple synchronized hybrid 
automata, which is then used to define IDS rules. However, modeling industrial 
processes accurately is a complex task that requires a deep understanding of the 
underlying process and a consideration for all the scenarios that may occur in the 
system. Due to these systems' complexity and the unknown disturbances during normal 
operation, the model-based IDS may suffer from low accuracy. On the other hand, 
signature-based IDS is also widely used by defining a set of patterns or rules for known 
attacks and violations. For example, a set of intrusion detection rules based on Modbus 
protocol specification and known attack signatures are defined in [8]. Even though 
signature-based IDS provide a low false alarm rate, but they come with the cost of 
incapability of detecting unknown attacks. This thesis focuses on building a multimodal 
IDS for CPS to detect cyber-attacks and any abnormal behaviors using deep multimodal 
learning techniques. The multimodal techniques could increase the attacks' 




from multiple sensors distributed across the CPS. More specifically, this thesis answers 
the following two research questions: 
• Can deep neural networks with multimodal techniques provide better 
performance for detecting CPS cyberattacks compared to other techniques? 
• How can deep multimodal techniques be adopted for building IDS for CPS? 
1.2. Thesis Objectives 
In this thesis, we aim to design a multimodal IDS that considers data from 
different CPS layers and can detect cyberattacks with higher accuracy. Multimodal 
deep learning approaches are investigated to combine data from different sensors to 
train a better attack detector. These techniques range from the simple concatenation of 
data at the input layer of the network, the fusion of the decisions from multiple 
classifiers at the output layer, to the learning of a hierarchical representation of the data 
across the network's hidden layers [9]. The focus of the thesis is on the later approach, 
which helps in learning a joint representation and finding the relationships between the 
different inputs. 
The aim of this research can be achieved through the following objectives: 
• Develop a CNN-based IDS trained on CPS time-series data preprocessed using 
Gramian Angular Field imaging. The IDS uses 3D CNN to capture better 
dependencies between the different time series along with using different merge 
techniques to fuse the data from different input sources.  
• Develop a multimodal IDS based on RNN and multimodal attention approach 
that considers different input modalities. 
• Conduct a comparative study with several state-of-the-art techniques using 





1.3. Thesis Contribution 
In this thesis, the problem of CPS cyberattacks detection is tackled using two 
different approaches. In the first approach, named IDS-ITS, we developed and 
evaluated an IDS based on Imaging Time Series. The approach is based on converting 
the time series of the sensors' and actuators' readings to images using the Gramian 
Angular Field (GAF) method, then training a CNN classifier to detect attacks. The 
CNN-based solution is selected because of its effectiveness in image classification tasks 
(e.g., [10] and [11]). This approach aims to leverage and incorporate the advanced 
techniques of computer vision for time series classification by obtaining a visual 
representation of the time series that captures the temporal correlation between the data 
points in order to enhance the accuracy of attacks detection. 
In the second approach, named IDS-MAN, we developed and evaluated RNN-
based IDS that leverages Multimodal Attention Network (MAN). The approach uses 
the GRU alternative to avoid the vanishing gradient problem in standard RNN [12]. 
Each input is processed separately by GRU layers, then the Bi-Modal framework [13] 
is used to leverage the multimodal information from each pair of modalities. The model 
is trained using supervised learning. However, to provide a better generalization to 
detect unseen attacks, embedding vectors for the classes are learned, and the detection 
output is determined by the distance between the classes' embeddings and the input. 
The motivation of using attention for multimodal learning is to leverage the most 
significant information from the different data sources for an efficient fusion. Recently, 
Multimodal Attention mechanisms were successfully applied in a wide range of Natural 
Language Processing (NLP) tasks such as video description [14], visual question 
answering [15], and sentiment analysis [13].  




• Design, implement and evaluate an IDS for CPS based on a two-pathways 3D 
CNN trained on imaging time-series produced using the Gramian Angular Field 
that converts sensors' and actuators' measurements and network traffic features 
into images. This representation enables the use of CNN, which is known for its 
superiority in image classification tasks. The evaluation of the proposed IDS 
demonstrates its superiority in terms of better attacks' discoverability by 
detecting some attacks that were not detected previously by related works.  
• Examine and evaluate four different multimodal merge techniques to enhance 
the IDS performance by combining the CNN two-pathways of process-level and 
network traffic features. 
• Design, implement and evaluate a multimodal IDS based on GRU that considers 
both CPS process data and network data as independent modalities. Then, use a 
multimodal attention approach to capture the inter-modality relations between 
each pair of modalities.  
• Enhance the generalization of attacks detection and compensate for the lack of 
labeled data for attack instances by developing an approach to learn embedding 
vectors for the normal and abnormal classes and perform the anomaly detection 
based on the cosine similarity.  
• Compare the two proposed models with other state-of-the-art techniques and 
evaluate the proposed models using different datasets. 
1.4. Thesis Outline  
This chapter presents an overview of the research problem along with the thesis 
objectives and contributions. The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows:  
CHAPTER 2: Provides the background of the IDS techniques and the deep learning 




CHAPTER 3: Explains the design and implementation of the proposed IDS-ITS. 
CHAPTER 4: Explains the design and implementation of the proposed IDS-MAN. 
CHAPTER 5: Presents the evaluation results of the developed IDSs. 





CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
2.1. Background 
2.1.1. Intrusion Detection Systems 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) provide a protection layer over CPS. Since CPS 
are multilayer systems, the IDS can be deployed at different areas of the system. The 
main two sources of data for IDS in CPS are the network traffic and the process data. 
Moreover, there are two main categories of IDS. The first one is the knowledge-based 
IDS which looks for events that match specific misbehavior. The second one is the 
behavior-based IDS that looks for events that deviate from the system's ordinary 
behavior. Figure 2 shows the different intrusion detection techniques for CPS. 
 
 
Figure 2: Intrusion detection techniques for CPS. 
 
2.1.1.1. Knowledge-Based IDS 
This type of IDS needs a predefined and well-established knowledge of specific 
patterns or misbehavior before implementing the IDS. This type of IDS can be 




IDS, the signatures for the known attacks are defined. Then, the IDS compares the 
observed events' signatures with the predefined patterns to detect anomalies. This 
method requires a large amount of memory because all the signatures should be saved. 
Also, it fails in detecting the threats with unknown signatures [16]. The second type of 
knowledge-based IDS is the protocol analysis-based IDS. Each protocol has a 
specification that defines its format and communication patterns. This IDS depends on 
the protocol's specification and looks for packets that violate the protocol's normal 
activity.  
The two types of knowledge-based IDS can be combined. For example,  in [8], 
a set of intrusion detection rules based on Modbus protocol specification and known 
attack signatures are defined. The IDS raises an alert if the coming traffic matches the 
predefined signatures or if the rules are violated. To build this IDS, a vulnerability 
analysis was conducted and a detailed understanding of the protocol requirement and 
specification was needed to define the rules. However, even though the knowledge-
based IDSs have a low false alarm rate, any attack that does not match any defined 
signatures will be undetected. Thus, recently all the research works have been focusing 
on the behavior-based IDS or the combination of both techniques. 
2.1.1.2. Behavior-Based IDS 
Instead of using predefined knowledge, the behavior-based IDS looks for events 
that deviate from the system's ordinary behavior. There are different behavior-based 
IDS categories, which are rule-based, statistical techniques, process-analysis, and 
machine learning and deep learning techniques. The rule-based IDS works first by 
knowing some prior knowledge, such as the distribution of the data. Then, the detection 
mechanism relies on a set of fixed rules. However, contrary to the signature-based IDS, 




arrival rate can be used as rules to detect many kinds of attacks. The rule-based anomaly 
detection technique is computationally cheap, simple, and fast. Another type is the 
statistical-based IDS which is similar to the rule-based IDS in which it learns the 
underlying distribution of the data. An example of statistical-based IDS is inspecting if 
a sensor reading is within a specific range. Because of the similarities between the rule-
based and statistical-based IDS, some research considered the combination of them. For 
example,  He et al. [17] proposed a rule and statistical-based IDS. First, a set of rules 
for specific network features is defined, including features at the packet layer, the flow 
layer, and the inter-flow layer. Then, statistical analysis based on the system's historical 
behavior is conducted to extract long-term metrics. Then these metrics are used to 
detect anomalies and trends that do not fit with what is normally observed. All the 
extracted features in the four layers of the IDS are used to profile the system's normal 
behavior, and the anomalies are detected if they deviate from this profile. 
Another type of behavior-based IDS is the process-analysis based which builds 
physical models to predict the expected output of the process. Although this type of 
IDS detects the process's abnormal behavior with very high accuracy, modeling the 
industrial processes accurately is very challenging because it needs a deep analysis of 
the underlying process. In [18], the authors study the Linear Parameter Varying (LPV) 
CPS for the scenarios of false data injection attacks. A system model is obtained based 
on the LPV state-space model. The model can predict the expected future sensor 
measurements. Then, the attack detection is performed by obtaining an estimate of the 
system's state and calculating the difference between the output of the attack detector 





The last type of behavior-based IDS is using machine and deep learning 
techniques. There are three categories for this type which are classification, forecasting, 
and unsupervised. First, in the classification, the IDS categorizes the data into different 
classes. This type requires a dataset with sufficient anomaly samples. An example of 
this IDS type is [19], where different machine learning algorithms are compared, 
namely support vector machine (SVM) random forest, k-nearest neighbor, and k-means 
clustering for anomaly detection using Modbus protocol datasets. Moreover, in [20], an 
anomaly detector for the process data based on a probabilistic neural network (PNN) 
was proposed to map the input variables to output classes.  
Second, the forecasting technique is based on time-series prediction for the 
normal behavior of the system. Then the anomalies are detected if the difference 
between the actual time series readings and the predicted values exceeds a threshold. 
Many deep learning algorithms have been used for this type of IDS. For example, Long 
Short Term Memory (LSTM) is used by [21], 1D Convolution Neural Network (CNN) 
is used in  [22], and Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP) is used in [23]. 
Third, the unsupervised technique creates a representational model for the 
normal behavior of the system. For example, in [24], two unsupervised machine 
learning methods are compared for anomaly detection using process data which are 
LSTM based Deep Neural Network (DNN) and one-class SVM. For the network traffic, 
Dong and Peng [25] used one-class SVM to build an anomaly detector for Modbus 
traffic. Moreover, Li et al. [26] proposed a Multivariate Anomaly Detection framework 







2.1.2. Deep Learning Techniques 
2.1.2.1. Convolution Neural Network (CNN) 
CNN is a specialized type of Neural Network that is mostly used in the computer 
vision field to process image data. The core component of the CNN is the convolution 
layer. The layer has several filters that are smaller in size than the input. Each filter 
moves across the input from top left to bottom right. The filter performs the convolution 
operation, which is the element-wise multiplication between the filter's weights and the 
input values. Then, the results are summed to represent all the learned features for this 
region. After the filter passes across the input, a features map is generated from each 
filter. For the output of the layer, all the feature maps resulting from the convolution 
layer are concatenated. The convolution layer's output is passed to an activation layer 
(e.g., ReLU, Tanh) to introduce non-linearity in the network. CNN also contains 
pooling layers that downsample the feature map's size by choosing one number (either 
the maximum of the average) from each map region to allow the network to train faster 
and focus on the most important features. Even though CNN is designed for 2-
dimensional data, they are extended to be used for 1-dimensional and 3-dimensional 
data. 
2.1.2.2. Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU) 
GRU is a type of RNN. The idea behind the RNN is to process sequential data 
by performing the same computation to every element in the input sequence, taking into 
consideration the computations of the previous elements. GRU was introduced by Cho, 
et al. in 2014 [12] to solve the vanishing gradient problem in vanilla RNN. The unit 










where 𝑊𝑟, 𝑈𝑟, 𝑊𝑧, and 𝑈𝑧  are trainable weights, and 𝜎 is the sigmoid function. Both 
gates have similar equations; however, each has its own set of weights and differs on 
how its output is used. The variables 𝑥𝑡 and ℎ𝑡−1 represent the input of the current 
timestep and the hidden state of the previous unit. The reset gate determines how much 
to forget from the information of the previous timesteps. The following equation 
represents this operation: 
ℎ𝑡
′ = tanh(𝑊𝑥𝑡 + 𝑟𝑡 ⊙ 𝑈ℎ𝑡−1) 
when 𝑟𝑡 is 0 the corresponding information in ℎ𝑡−1 will be forgotten, indicating 
irrelevant information to the future timesteps. The update gate is used to determine 
which past information needs to be considered for future timesteps and which new 
information needs to be added. ℎ𝑡 is calculated as follows: 
 ℎ𝑡 = 𝑧𝑡 ⊙ ℎ𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝑧𝑡) ⊙ ℎ𝑡
′  
2.2. Related Work 
2.2.1. Anomaly-based Intrusion Detection Systems (AIDS) 
2.2.1.1. IDS for CPS 
Recently, deep learning techniques have been widely deployed for anomaly 
detection using various neural network types. Long Short Term Memory (LSTM) RNN 
has been used by Goh et al. [21] for cyber-attacks detection in CPS by modeling the 
system's normal behavior. Then, the differences between the actual and the ideal 
sensors values that the RNN predicted are calculated. After that, the cumulative sum 
method is used to detect any small deviation that could correspond to anomalies. RNN 
was also used by [27] in a sequence-to-sequence encoding-decoding approach. The 
time series are encoded to predict the next values, while the decoder is used to predict 
the future operational data using the attention method. Then, the difference between the 




Convolution Neural Network is used in [28] combined with Isolation Forest models 
to build a hybrid attack detection framework for ICS. The proposed framework consists 
of two stages trained independently: the features extraction stage using 1D-CNN and 
the detection stage using the Isolation Forest. An autoencoder based on 1D-CNN is 
trained to extract features from the continuous-time signals (i.e., sensor measurements). 
The Isolation Forest model is then trained to perform the detection using the extracted 
features combined with the actuator's signals. In [22], an anomaly detection approach 
is proposed based on measuring whether the predicted values deviate from the observed 
values using 1D CNN. CNN is trained as a time series prediction model to predict the 
future values of the features. Then, to detect the anomalies, the differences between the 
predicted and actual values are calculated, and the z-score of each feature is compared 
to empirically predefined thresholds to determine anomaly existence. 
Other types of neural networks are used for IDS in CPS. For example, an anomaly 
detector for critical infrastructure based on a probabilistic neural network (PNN) was 
proposed in [20]. The PNN consisted of four layers, and the Bayesian strategy is used 
to map the input variables to output classes. Moreover, Li et al. [26]  proposed a 
Multivariate Anomaly Detection framework with Generative Adversarial Networks 
(MAD-GAN). To detect anomalies, both the GAN's discriminator and generator were 
exploited. The discriminator is used to classify the time series input and the generator 
is used to measure the residual between the input and the reconstructed samples by the 
generator. Then, the two losses are combined to detect possible anomalies in the data. 
Shalyga et al. [23] used a genetic algorithm to find the best neural network architecture 
for anomaly detection. The best model was based on the multilayer perceptron. The 
detection method is based on time series forecasting, and the mean error is used to 




 In [24], two unsupervised machine learning methods are compared for anomaly 
detection. The first method is LSTM based Deep Neural Network (DNN), which is used 
to implement probabilistic outlier detection. The second method is the one-class 
Support Vector Machine (SVM) used with the Radial Basis Function kernel to learn 
non-linear classification boundaries. DNN outperformed SVM with an improvement of 
0.4 in terms of F1-score. Lin et al. [29] used a different approach for anomaly detection 
by building a one-class classifier using a graphical-based approach (TABOR). Timed 
automata are used to model the behavior and the dynamics of the sensors and actuators. 
Then, Bayesian Networks are trained to capture the dependencies between the 
variables. TABOR works as a one-class classifier to detect any deviations from the 
normal learned behavior.  
2.2.1.2. Attention-based IDS 
The authors in [30] proposed an anomaly detection model for an ICS network in a 
real intelligent charging station and power supply system. The proposed model aimed 
to leverage the sequence relationship between network packets by capturing multi-
dimensional features from the traffic using Multi-Head Attention (MHA). The MHA 
helps in learning information from different traffic packets from different 
representation subspaces. The scaled dot-product is used as the attention function, and 
a residual connection is used to add the output of the MHA attention to the original 
data. The MHA layer's output is fed to a global average pooling and fully connected 
layers for classification. To evaluate the proposed model, two laboratory-scale State 
Grid ICS that reflect the industrial control network's characteristics are used. The results 
showed that the MHA model outperforms other methods such as LeNet, VGG, and 




An anomaly detection system of multi-stage attention with LSTM-based CNN is 
proposed in [31] for connected and automated vehicles. First, a CNN is used for the 
feature extraction, and the produced feature maps are converted into vectors to be fed 
to the Attention LSTM model. The softmax function is used for the attention weights, 
with Tanh as the alignment function. The attention mechanism aimed to analyze the 
data relationship and give scores to the data sequence based on their significance. The 
dataset used for evaluation included three sensors readings and four types of anomalies 
with different magnitudes. The results showed superior performance than other models 
even when the anomalous data had low magnitude in the input stream. 
An unsupervised attention-based deep learning framework is proposed in [32] for 
anomaly detection in network payloads and syscall traces. The proposed framework has 
three components. The first is the local model, which is implemented using either RNN 
or AutoEncoder (AE). The model used fixed-length subsequences to extract local 
features from the original input variable-length sequence. The second component 
constructs the normality clusters to represent the profile of the normal data. For 
clustering, the K-means algorithm is used to generate different clusters from the original 
training data to account for the normal data distribution irregularities. The third 
component is the attention network which aggregates the local feature vectors based on 
the normality. The additive attention is used to compute the correlation scores between 
the local feature vectors and the cluster centers. A global feature vector for each cluster 
is then calculated by the summation of the local feature vectors weighted by their 
attention distribution. For anomaly detection, the maximum likelihood estimation is 
used to select the final global representation from the set of global feature vectors for 
each cluster, and the vector with minimum distance is selected. The negative likelihood 




center of the clusters. The sequence is considered anomalous if the score exceeds a 
user-defined threshold. The framework is evaluated on the CSIC-2010 and ADFA-LD 
datasets. The results showed superior performance compared to previous work and non-
attention models. 
Kundu et al. [33] proposed an unsupervised anomaly detection framework using an 
attention-based auto-encoder (A3D) to detect false data injection attacks. The A3D 
framework consists of two encoder layers followed by an attention layer to compute 
the optimal weight vectors of every timestep of the encoder output. The attention 
vectors are multiplied by the encoder output and serve as input to the decoder. The 
divergence of reconstruction error is utilized to detect and localize the attacks, and the 
threshold is set using the precision-recall curve. The used data are collected from a real-
world power grid, and a simulation of the grid is created to simulate the attack scenarios. 
The simulated attacks include compromising 4, 8, 12, 16, 20, and random devices out 
of 39 measuring devices. The A3D model showed consistent performance for all the 
attack scenarios ranging from 0.94 to 0.99 F1-score compared to other supervised and 
unsupervised non-attention models.  
In [34], a network intrusion detection model based on two attention mechanisms is 
proposed. The model consists of location-based attention, which is implemented by a 
fully connected layer with a softmax activation to assign weights to the input features 
based on their importance. Following that, two Bidirectional GRU layers are used to 
process the time series. Then, dot-product attention is adopted for utilizing the adjacent 
traffic information to predict the current. The traffic information is grouped into slices, 
and for each timestep, a hidden representation is computed by a single-layer perceptron. 
Then, the softmax function is used to obtain the attention weights, and the weighted 




UNSW-NB15 dataset is used, and an improvement of 1.5% in the detection accuracy 
is achieved. 
2.2.2. Time Series Images 
The motivation of transforming time-series into images is to obtain a visual 
representation of the time series, which may reveal distinctive patterns that can be used 
to enhance the learning task. 
Yang et al. [35] proposed a method of imaging MTS data into 2D images by 
transforming each batch of the MTS into multiple images in which each image 
corresponds to one variable. Then the images are appended together vertically such that 
each time series is treated as an independent data channel. These aggregated images are 
then fed into CNN for classification.  
Similarly, in [36], the authors proposed an imaging MTS technique for sensors' 
classification by first transforming each time series into RGB colored images using 
GAF or MTF. Then, each image is separated into its three monochrome images so that 
for each mono-color, the images from all time-series are concatenated vertically into a 
bigger image of size 𝑚 ×  𝑠 ×  𝑚, where 𝑚 is the number of time-series and 𝑠 is the 
size of the individual images. Thus, the CNN will have 3 input channels; each 
corresponds to a mono-color and has a size of m x s x m.  
In [37], authors used the Gramian Angular Field and Recurrence Plot [38] to 
forecast the availability of crowdsourced services in a specific area based on their 
historical availability. For prediction, the obtained images are used as input to a residual 
learning-based deep neural network. The local phase quantization and local binary 





In [39], the authors analyzed the fund price time-series data to provide a fund 
recommendation framework by using multiple variables. A total of 16 variables were 
considered, which are categorized into 4 data types. For learning, intervals of 60 trading 
days are used, and the variables are converted to 16 GAF matrices. To fuse the variables 
into one image, the 16 GAF matrices were learned as heat maps which are arranged in 
4x4 sequential data form using 4 different colors; each one corresponds to one data 
type. This arrangement results in 16 60x60 images concatenated into 240x240 images 




CHAPTER 3: INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM BASED ON IMAGING TIME 
SERIES 
This chapter details the design of the intrusion detection system based on time series 
classification for CPS using imaging time-series approach and CNN. The high-level 
problem formulation for this IDS is: given a multivariate time-series of CPS data, either 
representing the physical process readings (i.e., sensors and actuators readings) or 
network traffic metrics, predict whether the system is operating normally or exhibiting 
abnormal behavior in the corresponding time-window.  
3.1. IDS-ITS Architecture 
Figure 3 depicts the proposed design for the Intrusion Detection System based on 
Imaging Time Series (IDS-ITS) for CPS. A sliding window-based approach is used for 
attack detection in which the time series is divided into 𝑇 time slots with an overlap 𝑙. 
The IDS-ITS takes as input a multivariate time series of size 𝑇 representing the physical 
process metrics of CPS (i.e., sensors and actuators) or network traffic to detect whether 
the data reflect the normal behavior of the system or exhibiting cyberattacks. The IDS 
will make a prediction every 𝑝 = 𝑇 − 𝑙. 
IDS-ITS network consists of two parts. The first part consists of two pathways. The 
first pathway is trained on the GAF images of the original MTS, 𝑆, of CPS attributes 
readings. For the second pathway, the input time series differs depending on the 
available data to the IDS. If the network data is available, the pathway is trained on the 
GAF images of the network traffic features extracted with the alignment of the process-
level data. Otherwise, the pathway is trained on the GAF images of artificial MTS 
representing the difference time series, 𝑆𝑑. This MTS is constructed by the difference 
between every two consecutive readings of the same attribute. Each pathway consists 




activation followed by a max-pooling layer. Then, the outputs of the pathways 𝑆𝐺𝐴𝐹 
and 𝑆𝑑_𝐺𝐴𝐹 are merged to obtain 𝑆𝐹. In the second part, the output 𝑆𝐹 is flattened and 
fed into a Batch Normalization layer followed by one fully connected layer and an 
output layer with sigmoid activation. The network is trained to minimize the cross-
entropy function  that measures how far is the network prediction 𝑌𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑 from the actual 
output 𝑌𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙.  
 
 
Figure 3: IDS-ITS architecture. 
 
3.2. Time-Series Images 
Our process of imaging time series is depicted in Figure 4. The Gramian Angular 
Field method [40] is used to obtain a visual description of the time series readings. In 






Figure 4: The process of imaging times series.  
 
Let X =  {x1, x2, … , xn} be a univariate time series of size 𝑛 and 𝑇 = 𝑡1, 𝑡2, … , 𝑡𝑛 is the 
corresponding timestamp i.e. 𝑥𝑖 is captured at a time 𝑡𝑖. The first step is to normalize 𝑋 
so that {𝑥𝑖}𝑖=1…𝑛 is in [−1,1]. This can be done as follows: 
    ?̂?𝑖 =  
2𝑥𝑖 − max(𝑋) − min(𝑋)
max(𝑋) − min(𝑋)
 
The scaled time series denoted by ?̂? is then transformed into polar coordinates. This 
can be achieved by applying the angular cosine on 𝑥?̂? to obtain the angle and encoding 
the timestamp 𝑡𝑖 as the radius: 
{




, 𝑡𝑖 ∈ 𝑇
 
where 𝑐 is a constant to control the span of the polar coordinates. The GAF images can 
be constructed using Gramian Angular Summation Field (GASF) and Gramian Angular 
Difference Field (GADF). The motivation is to exploit the temporal correlation between 
the time intervals of the same attribute by trigonometric means. 
GASF is a matrix of the form: 
𝐺𝐴𝑆𝐹 = (
cos(Φ1 +  Φ1) … 𝑐𝑜𝑠(Φ1 +  Φ𝑛)
𝑐𝑜𝑠(Φ2 +  Φ1) … 𝑐𝑜𝑠(Φ2 +  Φ𝑛)
⋮ ⋱ ⋮





Each 𝐺𝐴𝑆𝐹𝑖,𝑗 represents the temporal correlation by the summation of angular 
directions. The main diagonal of 𝐺𝐴𝑆𝐹 is the special case which represents the original 
angular information. 
GADF is a matrix of the form: 
𝐺𝐴𝐷𝐹 = (
cos(Φ1 −  Φ1) … 𝑐𝑜𝑠(Φ1 −  Φ𝑛)
𝑐𝑜𝑠(Φ2 −  Φ1) … 𝑐𝑜𝑠(Φ2 −  Φ𝑛)
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑐𝑜𝑠(Φ𝑛 −  Φ1) … cos(Φ𝑛 − Φ𝑛)
) 
𝐺𝐴𝐷𝐹 reflects the temporal correlation by the difference of angular directions. Figure 
5 shows the GADF and GASF images of the Level Indicator Transmitter sensor (LIT-
101) from the SWaT-2015 dataset for both normal and attack instances.  
 
 
Figure 5: Gramian Angular Field of Level Indicator Transmitter sensor readings from 
the SWaT-2015 dataset for a window size of 30 seconds. 
 
The Gramian matrix has a size of 𝑛 ×  𝑛, where 𝑛 is the length of the raw time 
series. Piecewise Aggregation Approximation (PAA) is used to reduce the size of the 
image, which is a dimensionality reduction method for time-series data. PAA converts 
the time series from length 𝑛 to 𝑠 by dividing the time series into 𝑠 segments and replace 
the data points in each segment by their average value. After applying PAA, images of 





3.3. Multivariate Time-Series 
The previous works for imaging MTS mostly use image concatenation to represent 
the images constructed from each time series into a 2D space. The main challenge of 
MTS classification is that the classifier has to capture the correlations and dependencies 
between the variables along with the features of the variables. The MTS consists of 
more than one time-dependent variable where each variable does not depend only on 
its previous values but also depends on the previous and current values of other 
variables. These dependencies introduce strong temporal correlations between the 
variables, which might not be captured by image concatenation. 
Our approach of imaging the MTS aims to preserve the temporal correlations by 
converting the time series into 3D images to capture more fine-grained representations 
of the features. The usage of 3D images will help capture the time dependencies by 
representing all the time series in the same time-space. To construct the 3D images, 
each MTS transformation will result in multiple images where each one corresponds to 
one univariate time series. All the images have the same size of 𝑠 ×  𝑠 where 𝑠 <  𝑛 
(𝑛 is the time series length). So, assuming there are 𝑚 variables, the transformation of 
each time window of the MTS to GAF will produce a 3D matrix of size 𝑚 ×  𝑠 ×  𝑠 
which can be perceived as a 3D image. 
3.4. Network Inputs 
There are two inputs to the IDS, the first input 𝑆 which is the MTS of the real 
readings of the variables in the CPS data. The MTS is defined as 𝑆 =  {𝑋1, 𝑋2, … , 𝑋𝑚}, 
where 𝑋𝑖 is a univariate time series and 𝑚 is the number of features in the dataset. All 
the univariate time series have the same length 𝑛, and the same timestamps 𝑇.  
For the second input, we consider two types. The first input type represents the 




representing the difference between the readings at timestamp 𝑡 and the previous 
readings at timestamp 𝑡 − 1 such that each point 𝑥𝑑𝑡 ∈ 𝑋𝑑𝑖 is equal to 𝑥𝑑𝑡 = 𝑥𝑡 − 𝑥𝑡−1. 
The intuition behind the difference time series is that under normal operations of the 
CPS, the variations between every two consecutive readings are expected to be very 
small. On the other hand, in the case of cyber-attack, unexpected variations in the 
readings are usually exhibited.  
The second type of input is the network traffic. In this case, the same notations are 
applied where 𝑋𝑑𝑖 refers to the time series of a specific network feature extracted by 
considering the aggregated network information at the same time-slots considered for 
collecting the process data. For example, if the process-level data are collected every 
second, the corresponding network features are extracted from all the packets in one 
second. Then, they are aggregated by either summing or averaging to have one input 
sample for each corresponding sample in the process-level data. Examples of 
aggregated network traffic are traffic volume, average inter-arrival time, and average 
response time.  
After constructing the input samples for both time series where each sample has a 
size of 𝑚 ×  𝑛, the samples are transformed into time series images using GADF or 
GASF to obtain images of size 𝑚 ×  𝑠 ×  𝑠. These images are the input to the CNN 
network. 
3.5. Merge Techniques 
The IDS network consists of two similar pathways 𝑆𝐺𝐴𝐹 and 𝑆𝑑_𝐺𝐴𝐹. The outputs of 
the two paths are merged to obtain 𝑆𝐹, which has the same 3D dimensions as the 
individual fused inputs, but a different number of activation maps based on the used 
merge technique. Several merge techniques are examined, which can be categorized 




concatenation and addition. The multimodal techniques include the Compact Bilinear 
Pooling (CBP) and EmbraceNet. 
3.5.1. Concatenation  
A simple concatenation of two or more inputs where all the inputs to the 
concatenation layer have the same 3D dimensions. For example, assuming we have two 
inputs to the concatenation layer with sizes 𝑚 × 𝑠 × 𝑠 × 𝑓1 and 𝑚 × 𝑠 × 𝑠 × 𝑓2 where 
𝑓 is the number of activation maps determined by the number of filters in the previous 
convolution layer. Then the concatenation layer will stack the two inputs and result in 
one output of size 𝑚 × 𝑠 × 𝑠 × (𝑓1 + 𝑓2) 
3.5.2. Addition  
Element-wise addition consists of summing all the corresponding entries from 
all inputs. The output of the Add layer will have the same shape as its inputs. 
3.5.3. Compact Bilinear Pooling 
The bilinear pooling method computes the outer product of two vectors to 
produce a combined representation of the vectors. Lin et al. applied the bilinear pooling 
for fine-grained visual recognition [41]. The architecture consisted of two feature 
extractors represented by CNNs. The resulting vectors were multiplied by an outer 
product and pooled to obtain a bilinear vector that is fully connected to an output layer. 
Even though a significant improvement was achieved for the visual recognition task, 
the outer product operation results in a remarkably high dimension representation of 
the bilinear vector. To tackle this inefficiency, Gao et al. introduced compact bilinear 
pooling that compresses the bilinear pooling efficiently for one input [42]. The compact 
bilinear pooling was adopted by Fukui et al. for multimodal learning for the task of 
visual question answering and visual grounding [43]. 
CBP applies the count sketch projection function Ψ to each modality by 




vectors are initialized randomly from a uniform distribution. The first vector 𝑠 ∈
{1, −1}𝑛, which has the same length as 𝑣 and contains either 1 or -1 for each index. The 
second vector ℎ ∈ {1, … 𝑑}𝑛, maps each index in 𝑣 to an index in 𝑦. To compute the 
values of 𝑦, first, it is initialized as a zero vector. Then for each element 𝑣𝑖, the 
corresponding element in ℎ is found, and 𝑦 is updated as: 
   𝑦[ℎ[𝑖]] = 𝑦[ℎ[𝑗]] + (𝑠[𝑖] × 𝑣[𝑖])  
After computing the count sketches for both modalities, the combined representation of 
the two modalities 𝑣1 and 𝑣2  is computed as: 
Φ(𝑣1, 𝑣2) =  𝐹𝐹𝑇
−1(𝐹𝐹𝑇(𝑦1) ⊙ 𝐹𝐹𝑇(𝑦2)) 
where the outer product of the two vectors is replaced by a convolution of the count 
sketches vectors. Then, the convolution operation is replaced by an element-wise 
product in the frequency domain. In our work, CBP is used to get a combined 




Figure 6: The steps of the multimodal compact bilinear pooling merge technique.  
 
3.5.4. EmbraceNet  
EmbraceNet [44] is a multimodal integration technique that consists of two 
components: the docking layers and embracement layers. The docking layers convert 
the input vectors to a dockable format to ensure that all vectors have the same size 𝑐. 




𝑑𝑘 = 𝑓(𝑤𝑖 ∙ 𝑥 + 𝑏𝑖) 
where 𝑓, 𝑤𝑖, 𝑏𝑖, and 𝑥 are the activation function, the weight vector, the bias, and the 
input vector. In the embracement layer, the input vectors are combined into one vector 
of size 𝑐. First, for each index 𝑖 of the dockable vectors, a vector 𝑟𝑖 of a length equal to 
the number of inputs is created from a multinomial distribution such that only one value 
is equal to 1 and the rest are 0. Each value in the output vector is computed as: 






where 𝑛 is the number of inputs. The output of the embracement layer combines data 
from all the inputs where 𝑟 determines which of the inputs contribute to each 
component in the output vector. Figure 7 illustrate the process of EmbraceNet with two 
inputs 𝑣1 and 𝑣2. 
 
 




CHAPTER 4: INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM BASED ON MULTIMODAL 
ATTENTION NETWORK 
In this chapter, the design of the proposed Multimodal Attention Intrusion Detection 
System (IDS-MAN) is presented along with the details of all the constituent 
components. The IDS processes the inputs time series using GRU layers. Then a 
Multimodal Attention technique is used to capture the most important relationships 
between the different modalities.  
4.1. IDS-MAN Architecture 
The model aims to leverage the different data sources of the CPS to learn a joint 
representation and find some relationships between the inputs for enhancing the attack 
detection accuracy. Figure 8 depicts the architecture for the IDS-MAN model. The 
model consists of three components: the modality paths, the Multimodal Attention 
Network  (MAN), and the output network. First, the data extracted from each source 
are processed independently by different modality paths. The input data sizes differ at 
each path, while all the outputs share the same dimensions. The modalities 
representations are then passed to the multimodal attention layers to learn the pair-wise 
joint representation between every pair of modalities. After that, the outputs from the 
MAN layers and the modality paths are concatenated to represent the joint global 
representation of all the modalities and their relationships. The joint representation is 
then passed to a batch normalization layer to standardize its inputs, followed by a time-
distributed dense layer. The output network receives the flattened vector and passes it 
to a dense layer to reduce its dimension. The network is trained with joint supervision 
using two output layers, a softmax layer to separate the inter-class difference and a 






Figure 8: IDS-MAN architecture. 
 
4.2. Modality Path 
Separate network paths process the raw data from each modality before the fusion. 
Let 𝑋 =  {𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑚} be the input to the IDS where 𝑚 is the number of modalities. 
Then 𝑥𝑖  ∈  ℝ
𝑠× 𝑓𝑖, where 𝑠 is the number of timesteps that is unified for all the 
modalities, and 𝑓𝑖 is the number of features in the corresponding modality. Each 
modality path has 𝑁 GRU layers followed by one Dense layer. The output of the GRU 
layer can be represented by 𝑅𝑖 ∈ ℝ
𝑠×𝑢, where 𝑢 is the number of units in the GRU 
layer. The output of the last GRU is passed to a time-distributed dense layer to process 
each temporal slice. The dense layer result in 𝐷 ∈ ℝ𝑠×𝑑, where 𝑑 is the number of units 
in the dense layer. For our model, we used bidirectional GRU (Bi-GRU) that consists 
of two GRUs. The first one processes the input in a forward direction where the state 
of each timestep is determined by the past timesteps. The second one processes the data 
in a backward direction in which the state of each timestep is determined by the future 
timesteps. The output is the concatenation of the forward and backward GRUs.   
4.3. Multimodal Attention Learning 
For the design of our IDS, we adopted the Multimodal Attention technique followed 




representation for every pair of modalities. Figure 9 shows the inner computations for 
the MAN layer. Assuming we have two sources of data, 𝐷 and 𝑇. Then the modalities 
representations are 𝐷 ∈  ℝ𝑠×𝑑 and 𝑇 ∈  ℝ𝑠×𝑑 where 𝑠 is the timesteps and 𝑑 is the 
dimension of dense layer output. First, the cross-modality representations 𝑀1 and 𝑀2 
are computed by the dot product. Then, the attention weights for the 𝑀1 and 𝑀2 are 
calculated by the softmax function to assign probability scores to every timestep. 
 𝑀1 = 𝑇
𝑇 ∙ 𝐷  and 𝑀2 = 𝐷












The intuition behind the dot product operation is to find the association between the 
feature vectors of every two timesteps in the two modalities. The attention weights are 
computed to emphasize the more contributing associations. After that, the modality-
wise attentive representations are calculated as follows: 
𝑂1 = 𝑁1 ∙ 𝑇 and 𝑂2 = 𝑁2 ∙ 𝐷 
Multiplying the attention weights by the modality representation implies that the 
modalities will have different contributions to the final representation. Finally, element-
wise matrix multiplication is computed to model the interaction between the 
multimodal specific representation of each modality (i.e., O) and the other modality 
representation. Then, the concatenation of the two matrices accounts for the output of 
the MAN layer.  
𝐴1 =  𝑂1 ⊙ 𝐷 and 𝐴2 =  𝑂2 ⊙ 𝑇 






Figure 9: The multimodal attention computations. 
 
After obtaining the pair-wise joint representations for every pair of modalities, all the 
outputs of the MAN layers are concatenated together with the modality paths' outputs 
obtaining a joint global representation. The output of the concatenation is 𝐹 ∈  ℝ𝑠×𝑑
𝑐
 
where 𝑑𝑐 is computed as: 
𝑑𝑐  =  𝑠 × 𝑑(𝑚 + 2𝐶(𝑚, 2)). 
𝐶(𝑚, 2) =  
𝑚!
(2! (𝑚 − 2)!)
 
After that, a Batch Normalization layer is used to stabilize the network's training, 
followed by a time-distributed dense layer to perform the same processing to each 
timestep. The output of the dense layer is then passed to a flatten layer. 
4.4. Output Network 
The output network consists of three layers. The first one is a dense layer to reduce 
the size of the flattened vector. The output of this layer serves as the vector 
representation of the input which is used in the detection. It can be represented as 𝑉 ∈
ℝ𝑑
𝑣
, where 𝑑𝑣 is the number of units in the dense layer. The second layer is a softmax 




loss layer which is used to learn embedding representations of the classes. The network 
is trained using joint supervision between the softmax loss 𝐿𝑠 and the center loss 𝐿𝑐. 
The total loss is given as: 
𝐿 =  𝐿𝑠 + 𝜆𝐿𝑐 
where 𝜆 is a scalar used to balance between the two losses.  
4.4.1. Center Loss 
The center loss is proposed in [45] to enhance the discriminative power of the 
learned features in deep neural networks and decrease the variance of the intra-class 
features. The intuition behind the center loss is to learn a center of deep features for 
each class and train the network to minimize the distance between the deep features and 
their class center. In this work, we adopt the same computations of the center loss but 
extend the deep feature's dimension to learn embedding vectors for the classes instead 









where 𝑏 is the batch size and 𝑣𝑦𝑖 denotes the embedding vector of the class 𝑦𝑖. 
Typically, the class embedding vectors should be updated every epoch; however, 
because the network is trained using mini-batches of size 𝑏, a scalar parameter 𝛼 is 
introduced to control the learning rate of the embedding at each iteration. The update 
equation of the embedding vector is the same as the update equation for the centers 






∑ 𝑣𝑗 − 𝑥𝑖 ∈
𝑏
𝑖=1  𝑗








4.5. Attacks Detection 
After training the network to produce embedding vectors for the classes, the cosine 
similarity is used to measure the similarity between the learned classes' embedding 
vectors 𝑣𝑗  and the vector of the input's deep learned features 𝑥𝑖. The cosine similarity 










CHAPTER 5: INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM EVALUATION 
5.1. CPS Datasets 
There is a lack of available CPS datasets that provides multimodal data from 
different CPS layers. Thus, we used the SWaT-2015 dataset, which contains process-
level data from different physical process stages. In addition, we used the SWaT-2019 
dataset, which is a small-scale dataset containing process-level and network-level data  
5.1.1. The Secure Water Treatment Datasets 
For evaluating the proposed models, two datasets constructed from the Secure 
Water Treatment (SWaT) fully operational testbed are used  [46].  The process of SWaT 
has six stages. In the first stage, the raw water is stored in a tank, then passed to the 
second stage to assess the water quality. In the third stage, the water is filtered to remove 
unwanted materials, followed by a dechlorination process to remove any remaining 
chlorine in the fourth stage. After that, the water goes through the reverse osmosis 
system to reduce the inorganic impurities. At the last stage, the water is stored and 
prepared for distribution. Each stage in the process contains multiple sensors and 
actuators. Besides the physical process, the SWaT testbed communication is designed 
to resemble the real communications in CPS, consisting of a layered communication 
network of two levels, programmable logic controllers, human-machine interfaces, and 
a historian data server. The used datasets are collected using different data collection 
setups in 2015 and 2019.   
5.1.1.1. SWaT 2015 
This dataset contains data from 24 sensors and 27 actuators across the six stages 
of the process at the physical process level. The data were collected for 11 days, 
considering the testbed's normal operation for 7 days and several attack scenarios for 




and actuators categorized into single-stage single-point, single-stage multi-point, multi-
stage single-point, and multi-stage multi-point. Each attack lasted between few minutes 
to several hours. During this period, the sensors' and actuators' data were continuously 
recorded every second in the historian server, resulting in a dataset containing 946,722 
samples for 51 attributes. Table 1 presents the attack scenarios in the SWaT-2015 
dataset. 
 
Table 1: Attack Scenarios in SWaT-2015 Dataset. 
Attack# Attack Point Attack Scenario 
1 MV-101 Open MV-101 to cause tank overflow 
2 P-102 Turn on P-102 to cause pipe bursts 
3 LIT-101 Increase by 1 mm every second to damage P-101 and 
cause tank underflow 
6 AIT-202 Set AIT-202=6 to cause P-203 to turn off and change the 
water quality 
7 LIT-301 The water level increased above HH, which causes the 
stop of the inflow. 
8 DPIT-301 Set DPIT >40kpa, which causes a decrease in the water 
level of tank 401 and  
an increase in the water level of tank 301 
10 FIT-401 Set FIT-401 <0.7 to shutdown the UV. 
11 FIT-401 Set FIT-401=0 to shutdown the UV. 
13 MV-304 Close MV-304 to halt stage 3. 
14 MV-303 Do not let MV-303 open to halt stage 3. 
16 LIT-301 Decrease water level by 1mm each second to cause tank 
overflow. 
17 MV-303 Do not let MV-303 open to halt stage 3. 
19 AIT-504 Set AIT-504=16 uS/cm, which causes the RO to 
shutdown and water go to drain. 
20 AIT-504 Set AIT-504=255 uS/cm, which causes the RO to 
shutdown and water go to drain. 
21 MV-101, 
LIT-101 





Stop UV-401, set AIT502=150, and force P-501 to 
remain on to damage the RO. 
23 P-602, DIT-
301, MV-302 
Set DPIT-301>0.4 bar, keep MV-302 open, and keep P-
602 closed to cause a system freeze.  




Attack# Attack Point Attack Scenario 
25 LIT-401, P-
401 




P-101 is turned on continuously and set LIT-301=801 
mm, which causes  
tank 101 underflow and tank 301 overflow 
27 P-302, LIT-
401 
Keep P-302 on, and set LIT401=600 mm for 9 minutes to 
cause tank overflow 
28 P-302 Close P-302 to stop the inflow of tank T-401 
29 P-201, P-
203, P-205 




Turn on P-101 and MV-101, set LIT-101=700 mm, P-102 
started itself because LIT301 level became low. This 
cause tank 101 underflow and Tank 301 overflow 
31 LIT-401 Set LIT-401 to less than L to cause tank overflow 
32 LIT-301 Set LIT-301 to above HH to cause tank underflow and 
damage P-302 
33 LIT-101 Set LIT-101 to above H to cause tank underflow and 
damage P-101 
34 P-101 Turn P-101 off to stop the outflow. 
35 P-101; P-102 Turn P-101 off and keep P-102 off to stop the outflow 
36 LIT-101 Set LIT-101 to less than LL to cause tank overflow 
37 P-501, FIT-
502 
Close P-501 and set FIT-502=1.20 after 90 seconds to 
reduce the output. 
38 AIT-402, 
AIT-502 
Set AIT402=260 and AIT502=260 to cause the water to 
go to the drain because of overdosing 
39 FIT-401, 
AIT-502 
Set FIT-401=0.5 and AIT-502=140 mV to shutdown UV, 
and water  
will go to RO. 
40 FIT-401 Set FIT-401=0 to shutdown UV, and water will go to RO. 
41 LIT-301 Decrease value by 0.5 mm per second to cause tank 
overflow 
 
5.1.1.2. SWaT 2019 
This dataset considered two modalities of data: the physical process and network 
traffic. The duration is  3 hours and 40 minutes, which results in 13211 samples for the 
process data covering 81 sensors and actuator values. The raw network traffic is 
provided in pcap files capturing all the network activities of the testbed. The dataset 
contains two attack scenarios. For the first attack, the historian data are exfiltrated by 




has 4 instances with a duration of 5 minutes for each one. In the second attack, the 
SCADA workstation is infiltrated by the command and control (C2) malware to disrupt 
the sensor and actuator readings. The attack has 5 instances with a duration of 3 minutes 
each. The dataset does not provide the details of the attacks' targets and their impact. 
For our experiments, we extracted several protocol-based features from the 
network traffic. The timestamps of the network features are aligned with the recorded 
process features. Also, a time window of 1 second is used since the process features are 
recorded every 1 second. For each protocol, 6 features are extracted at the packet level. 
Then the feature's values are either averaged or summed for the duration of the time 
window. Along with the protocol-based features, 3 other features are extracted to 
describe the overall network traffic characteristics for the time window duration. The 
total number of features is 207 with 34 different protocols. Table 2 present the extracted 
features and their description. For this dataset, we have two modalities: the process data 
𝑃 ∈ ℝ𝑠×81, and the network data 𝑁 ∈ ℝ𝑠×207 where s is the size of the time window. 
 
Table 2: The Network Features for SWaT 2019 Dataset. 
Features Description 
Overall Average time-delta The average time between every two consecutive 
packets. 
Total data size The total size of the exchanged data. 
Total volume The total number of packets. 
Protocol-
based 
TCP stream average 
delta-time 
The average time between every two consecutive 
packets in the same TCP stream. 
Average response 
time 
The average time taken by the request to reach the 
destination and acknowledged by the sender 
Average frame 
length  
The average frame length of all the packets for the 
protocol 
Total data size The total size of the exchanged data across the 
network for the protocol 
Total frame length The total frame length of all the packets for the 
protocol 





5.2. Evaluation Metrics 
To evaluate the performance of the proposed models, we used precision, recall; 
also called sensitivity or true positive rate (TPR), specificity; also known as the true 



















𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁
 
where true positive (TP) refers to the correctly detected attacks, true negative (TN) 
refers to the normal samples that are classified correctly, false positive (FP) indicates 
having a normal sample that is misclassified as an attack, and false negative (FN) is 
when an attack sample is misclassified as normal. The accuracy and F1-score show the 
overall performance of the IDS. Thus, the hyperparameters tuning will be based on 
those two metrics. In addition, the recall for each attack is recorded for the sake of 
comparing our results with previous works. 
5.3. Data Preprocessing 
The SWaT-2015 dataset contains 946,722 samples with a distribution of 94% 
for the normal class and 6% for the attack class. Selecting the entire samples of the 
dataset would introduce a huge imbalance between the normal and the attack samples, 
and the prediction would be biased towards the normal class. Hence, in our experiment, 
only the 449,921 samples that are recorded under the attacks are considered. For the 




normal samples and oversampling for the attack samples. On the other hand, for the 
IDS-MAN model, imbalanced data is used.  
The datasets contain binary and continuous features with different ranges for 
each feature. Thus, feature normalization is needed to ensure that all features have the 
same scale. Feature normalization makes the learning process easier by ensuring that 
all the features have the same significance in training and avoid having the results 
skewed toward a particular feature. Standard normalization is used for the SWaT-2015 
dataset in which the data are standardized by removing the mean then scaling to the unit 
variance. For the SWaT-2019 dataset, the min-max normalization is used, which scales 
the data between [0,1]. 
For data splitting, we used an 80%-20% train-test split with cross-validation. In 
the SWaT-2015 datasets, the attacks are not repeated, so the testing is performed on 
unknown attacks for each fold. For the SWaT-2019 dataset, the splitting ratios vary for 
each split to ensure no attack instance span over the two splits.  
5.4. Experimental Settings  
The proposed models are implemented using the TensorFlow framework high-
level API, Keras. Our networks are created using Keras functional API since they have 
non-linear topologies and more than one input. The evaluation for the SWaT-2019 was 
carried using the Google Collaboratory platform with Google compute engine backend. 
For the SWaT-2015, the evaluation was performed on a Quad GPU Desktop with RTX 
6000. For evaluation, 5-fold cross-validation is used to test the models' performance on 







5.5. IDS-ITS Evaluation Results 
5.5.1. Model Parameters 
For the IDS-ITS model, the hyperparameters that need tuning are the window size 
and the sliding period. Besides, the network's hyperparameters which are the number 
of CNN blocks, the CNN layers' parameters, and the regularization values. 
5.5.1.1. Window Size 
To convert the time series to images, a window-based approach is used for attack 
detection. The choice of the time window size plays a major role in the performance of 
the anomaly detection system. The window size determines the most suitable period 
that reflects the system's behavior to detect the corresponding label for this period. 
Figure 10 shows the performance of the different window sizes ranging from 10s to 60s 
using a sliding window of 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒/2. For the SWaT-2015 dataset, smaller time 
windows tend to have better performance in which the time windows of 10s and 30s 
achieved the same F1-score. However, the lowest recall is obtained by the 10s window. 
Thus, for the SWaT-2015 dataset, we choose the time window of 30s, which provided 
the best balance between the precision and the recall. For SWaT-2019, we choose the 
time window of 40s, which obtained the highest F1-score. 
 
 






After choosing the most suitable window size, we tune the period of the window 
slide. Figure 11 shows the model's performance with a sliding window of values 
ranging from 1s to 30s for the SWaT-2015 dataset. A sliding window of 1s means that 
the model will make a prediction as soon as a new sample arrives because in the used 
datasets, the data are collected every second. On the contrary, a sliding window of 30s 
means there will be no overlap between the samples, and only one prediction will be 
performed every 30s. For the SWaT-2015 dataset, the model trained with a sliding 
window of 1s obtained the best performance in terms of precision, recall, F1-score, 
accuracy, and TNR. For SWaT-2019, we used a sliding window of 1s to increase the 
number of samples since the dataset is small. 
 
 
Figure 11: The evaluation metrics vs. sliding period ranging from 1s to the window size 
for IDS-ITS 
 
5.5.1.2. Network Parameters 
The network's hyperparameters are tuned to achieve a balance between 
overfitting and underfitting. The hyperparameters of the IDS-ITS network include the 
number of CNN blocks, the CNN layers' parameters such as the number of filters and 




Table 3 provides the tuned values. For training, we used Adam optimizer with an initial 
learning rate of 0.001. Moreover, to avoid overfitting, we used an early stopping 
condition to stop the training when the loss does not improve 3 epochs.  
 
Table 3: The Results of Hyperparameter Tuning for IDT-ITS. 
Hyperparameter Value 
CNN Layer 1 32 
CNN Layer 2 64 
CNN Layer 3 128 
CNN Kernel 3 
Dense Layer 256 
Activation ReLU 
L2 Regularization (hidden layers) 0.01 
L2 regularization (output layer) 0.3 (SWaT-2015), 0.01 (SWaT-2019) 
Initial Learning Rate 0.001 
 
5.5.2. Merge Techniques 
To compare the different merge approaches, similar models are trained with the 
different techniques. For SWaT-2015, the two inputs have the same dimension, so the 
4 merge techniques are used. On the other hand, for SWaT-2019, the images of the two 
modalities have different dimensions because each has a different number of features. 
So, to map the inputs to the same dimension before merging the two modalities, the 
images are flattened and passed to a dense layer. Thus, only three merge techniques are 
used since the CBP requires the input to be in image format. Figure 12 shows the 
performance of the different models trained using the 4 merge methods along with 
models that are trained using only one input. We refer to compact bilinear pooling as 
CBP, concatenation as CC, addition as Add, EmbraceNet as ENet. For SWaT-2015, OP 
refers to a one-path model trained on the original time-series images. For SWaT-2019, 
PP refers to the model trained using process-level data, and NP refers to the model 




For SWaT-2015, ENet achieved the best performance in terms of F1-score, 
accuracy, precision, and TNR, followed by CBP by a difference of 0.5% in the accuracy 
and F1-score. On the other hand, the CC obtained the highest recall but a lower F1-
score and accuracy by 8% compared to the ENet. Moreover, the models with two paths 
show an improvement of 0.3%, 0.6%, 8%, and 9% for Add, CC, CBP, and ENet, 
respectively, in F1-score compared to the OP model.  
 For SWaT-2019, ENet obtained the best performance for all the evaluation 
measures, followed by CC with accuracies of 79% and 76% and F1-scores of 56% and 
51%. On the other hand, the PP and NP models showed significantly lower F1-scores 
falling behind the ENet model, with 29% and 23% differences. The Add model 
achieved a slightly better F1-score compared to the PP and NP models. However, it 
obtained the lowest accuracy among all the models. 
 
 
Figure 12: The evaluation metrics for the different merge techniques for the IDS-ITS 
model. 
 
5.5.3. Input Paths for SWaT-2015 
The last column in Table 6 shows the recall values for each attack for five different 
variations of IDS-ITS for the SWaT-2015 dataset. To emphasize the significance of the 




time series 𝑆 while the other four are trained using the two paths with different merge 
techniques. The OP model achieved a better detection rate for 11 attacks compared to 
the average results of the two-path models, with an increase ranging from 1% to 37%.  
It is worth noting that most of the attack that obtained remarkably better results with 
the OP model target actuators with discrete values. This is because, for any variations 
in the actuator’s readings, the values of the difference between every two consecutive 
readings are discrete. In the case of attacks, the variations in the difference values only 
occur at the instances that indicate the start and the end of attacks. All other instances 
in which the values do not change have values equal to 0. Thus, adding the second 
network path that is trained on the difference time series does not contribute 
significantly in distinguishing these attacks since most of the records are zeros. For the 
two-path models, most of the attacks that obtained a remarkably higher detection rate 
target sensors with continuous values with small consistent variations in their readings. 
So, in general, for normal instances, the difference time series values are not constant.  
5.6. IDS-MAN Evaluation Results 
5.6.1. Model Parameters 
For the IDS-MAN model, three hyperparameters need to be tuned: the window size, 
the dimension of embedding vectors for the classes, and the learning rate 𝛼 for the 
embedding update. Moreover, all the network's hyperparameters need to be tuned, 
including the number of GRU layers, the number of units, and the regularization values. 
5.6.1.1. Window Size 
The window size refers to the number of timesteps to be considered for each 
input to the network. To tune the window size, we choose to compare between the sizes 
of 120, 90, 60, and 30 seconds with a sliding window of 5 seconds for SWaT-2015 and 




2015, we choose a window size of 30s, which achieved a slightly higher F1-score and 
TNR. For SWaT-2019, the window of size 60s obtained the best F1-score, accuracy, 
precision, and TNR. 
 
 
Figure 13: The evaluation metrics vs. window size ranging from 30s to 120s for the 
IDS-MAN model. 
 
After choosing the window size, we tune the period of the window slide. Figure 
14 shows the model's performance with a sliding window of values ranging from 1s to 
30s for the SWaT-2015 dataset. The model trained with a sliding window of 5s obtained 
the best performance in the recall, F1-score, and accuracy. For SWaT-2019, we used a 






Figure 14: The evaluation metrics vs. sliding period ranging from 1s to the window size 
for IDS-MAN. 
 
5.6.1.2. Embedding vectors dimension 
Figure 15 shows the evaluation results for different dimensions of the embedding 
vectors. The dimension is tuned for the values 32, 64, 128, 256, and 512 for SWat-2015 
and 2, 8, 16, 32, and 64 for SWaT-2019. For SWaT-2015, the dimension of 32 achieved 
the best precision, TNR, and F1-Score, but the lowest recall. On the other hand, the best 
recall is obtained by the 256 dimension. Accordingly, we choose the dimension of 128, 
which provided the best balance between the precision and recall obtained by the other 
dimensions. For SWaT-2019, the embedding dimension of 32 achieved the best F1-






Figure 15: The evaluation metrics vs. embedding dimensions for the IDS-MAN model. 
 
5.6.1.3. Learning Rate for the Embeddings 
The learning rate 𝛼 controls the update of the embedding vectors at each iteration 
to avoid the large change that could happen due to unrepresentative batches. Figure 16 
shows the IDS's performance for 𝛼 ranging from 0.1 to 1 with a step of 0.1. As shown 
from the figure, for SWaT-2015, the values of F1-score, recall, TNR, and accuracy are 
stable for 𝛼 between 0.1 to 0.6. On the other hand, as 𝛼 increases, the performance 
exhibits an increase in the recall value with the cost of the degradation of all other 
metrics. For SWaT-2019, no noticeable trend is observed. We choose 𝛼 = 0.4, which 
provided a balance between the TNR and TPR for both datasets. 
 
 





5.6.1.4. Network Parameters 
The hyperparameters of the IDS-MAN network are the number of GRU layers, 
the number of units in the GRU and dense layers, the activation functions, the 
regularization value, and the learning rate. Table 4 provides the tuned values for the 
two datasets. For training, we used Adam optimizer with an initial learning rate of 
0.001. Moreover, to avoid overfitting, we used early stopping to stop the training when 
the loss does not show improvement for 10 epochs and return the weights of the best 
epoch.  
 
Table 4: The Results of Hyperparameter Tuning for IDS-MAN. 
Hyperparameter Value (SWaT-2015) Value (SWaT-2019) 
GRU Units 1 32 300 
GRU Units 2 64 - 
GRU Dropout 0 0.5 
Dense Units (before MAN) 64 128 
Dense Units (after MAN) 128 128 
Dense Dropout  0 0.7 
Activation LeakyReLU Tanh 
L2 Regularization  0.8 0.1 
Initial Learning Rate 0.001 0.001 
 
5.6.2. Merge Techniques 
For the SWaT-2015 dataset, we consider each stage of the process as a separate data 
source. On the other hand, for SWaT-2019, two different data sources are available, 
which are the physical process and the network traffic. 
To evaluate the significance of using different data sources for the IDS, we build 
three different models for SWaT-2019. Two models use data from one source, while 
the third model uses the two modalities. The model with two modalities uses the 
multimodal attention network (MAN). For the models with one modality, MAN is 




models. The model with two modalities achieved a remarkably higher F1-score with an 
increase of 22% and 38% for the process and network models. Moreover, significant 
improvements are shown in the accuracy, precision, and TNR. Meanwhile, the recall 
remains relatively constant for the three models.  
 
 
Figure 17: The evaluation metrics for the IDS-MAN model and the two SA models. 
 
To evaluate the effectiveness of using multimodal attention to combine the 
modalities, we constructed two models using simple merging techniques, which are 
concatenation and addition. Figure 18 shows the performance of the two merge 
techniques and the IDS-MAN. The IDS-MAN obtained the best performance for all the 
evaluation measures with an F1-scores of 71%, followed by CC 62% and Add 50% for 
SWaT-2019. The same sequence is observed with SWaT-2015 with F1-scores of 87%, 






Figure 18: The evaluation metrics for the IDS-MAN and different merge techniques. 
 
5.7. Comparison with Related Work 
5.7.1. Evaluation using SWaT-2015 Dataset 
IDS-ITS is able to detect all the attacks with an average detection rate of 82%. The 
IDS-MAN achieved a better detection rate of 84%; however, two attacks were not 
detected. Some attacks were harder to detect due to the nature of the attack target. IDS-
ITS obtained low detection rates for attacks 13 and 14, while attack 14 is not detected 
by IDS-MAN. Those attacks target the same type of actuators in the same process: the 
motorized valves MV-303 and MV-304. The two attacks aimed to halt the operation of 
process 3. However, as mentioned in the dataset description, unexpected outcomes 
occurred, and the intent of the attacker was not achieved. Thus, these attacks were 
harder to detect since no effects are shown on other variables in the same process. 
Moreover, attacks 6, 19, 20, and 38 got low detection rates with IDS-ITS. Meanwhile, 
for IDS-MAN, attacks 3, 19, 31, 33, and 38 obtained low detection rates. All of those 
attacks did not cause an actual change in the process.  
The data types of the attack targets affect the detection of the attacks. Generally, all 
the attacks that target the motorized valves (MV) and pumps (P), which are actuators 
with discrete values, have a lower detection rate than the average. In IDS-ITS, the 




for the attacks that have at least one target with continuous values. This behavior is only 
observed with the IDS-ITS since small transitions in the actuators' values are exhibited 
under attacks. So it was harder for the network to detect the patterns of the instances 
for these attacks. An exception to that is attack 28, which lasted for more than 9 hours. 
This suggests that the attack period also affects the detection rate of the attacks. The 
results show that, generally, the attacks that span more than 30 minutes have a higher 
detection rate with an average of 69% and 62% compared to an average detection rate 
of 48% and 40% for attacks with a period of less than 30 minutes for the IDS-ITS and 
IDS-MAN respectively. Since the attack period determines the number of instances 
used for training the model, attacks with larger periods will have higher chances of 
getting recognized.  
Another reason that affects the detection rate is the variance of the attack targets. 
The attacks with level sensors (LIT in SWaT) as the attack targets have significantly 
higher detection rates. It was observed that the values of these sensors have a very high 
variance. This observation also shows that variables with discrete values have lower 
detection rates since those variables typically tend to have low variance. This behavior 
is exhibited only with the IDS-ITS because of the characteristic of the imaging time-
series approach. GAF images capture the temporal correlations between every two 
points by the difference or the summation of their angular directions. So, having low 
variance results in images with similar patterns for normal and attack instances since 
the values do not change frequently, and the angular cosine will be equal for many of 
the values. On the other hand, for variables with high variance, different patterns are 
obtained from the normal and attack instances since the attacks set the variables to 




normal and attack instances are different, producing GAF images that can be more 
distinguishable. 
The IDS-MAN showed superior performance for detecting the multi-points attacks 
that target more than one sensor or actuator either at the same stage or at different 
stages. The average detection rate for multi-point attacks is 72% compared to 52% for 
single-point attacks. The contrary is observed for the IDS-ITS in which the single-point 
attacks obtained an average detection rate of 58% compared to 49% for the multi-point 
attacks. This result suggests that the IDS-MAN is able to provide better discoverability 
of some of the attacks by capturing the correlations between the sensors and actuators 
at the different stages of the process. 
The performance evaluation results for the SWaT-2015 dataset are summarized in 
Table 5. The accuracy and TNR are recorded; however, most related works did not 
include these measures. Moreover, Table 6 shows a comprehensive comparison with 
previous works in terms of the recall values per attack. The works for DNN, SVM, 
TABOR, 1D CNN, MLP, MAD-GAN, and 1D CNN-IF are described in section 2.2.1.1. 
The DNN and SVM [24] are considered as the baseline since they are the first work 
that used this dataset for IDS. The comparison shows that the IDS-ITS model achieved 
better results for 12 attacks. Moreover, it took the lead in detecting attacks 13 and 14, 
which are not detected by any previous work. On the other hand, the IDS-MAN 
achieved better results for 7 attacks compared to the related work and for 4 attacks 







Table 5: Comparison Between Different Detection Methods for SWaT-2015 Dataset. 
Method Precision Recall F1 Accuracy TNR Detected  
Attacks 
DNN [24] 0.983 0.678 0.803 - - 13 
SVM [24] 0.925 0.699 0.796 - - 20 
TABOR [29] 0.862 0.788 0.823 - - 22 
1D CNN 1 [22] 0.968 0.791 0.871 - - - 
1D CNN 2 [22] 0.867 0.854 0.860 - - 30 
MLP [23] 0.967 0.696 0.812 - - 25 
MAD-GAN [26] 0.990 0.637 0.770 - - - 
1D CNN-IF [28] - - - 0.920 - 26 
IDS-ITS CC 0.737 0.865 0.796 0.767 0.660 35 
Add 0.768 0.820 0.793 0.776 0.727 34 
CBP 0.953 0.802 0.871 0.875 0.956 35 
Enet 0.957 0.807 0.876 0.880 0.960 35 

















Table 6: Recall Comparison for the Individual Attacks Between Previous Works and 
the IDS-ITS Model with the Different Merge Techniques and the IDS-MAN Model for 
SWaT-2015 Dataset. 




MAN OP CBP CC Add Enet 
1 0.00 0.05 1.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.19 0.17 0.03 0.14 
2 0.00 0.93 1.00 0.76 0.02 0.12 0.30 0.22 0.02 0.94 
3 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.18 0.79 0.86 0.82 0.74 0.07 
6 0.72 1.00 0.90 0.95 0.08 0.11 0.50 0.32 0.08 0.96 
7 0.89 0.00 1.00 0.91 0.92 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.96 
8 0.92 0.61 1.00 0.98 0.10 0.16 0.72 0.59 0.18 0.97 
10 0.43 0.99 1.00 0.98 0.58 0.94 1.00 0.98 0.91 1.00 
11 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.85 0.95 0.99 1.00 0.99 1.00 
13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.04 0.23 0.19 0.04 0.02 
14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.12 0.28 0.23 0.04 0.00 
16 0.00 0.00 0.24 0.60 0.07 0.83 0.89 0.87 0.81 0.24 
17 0.00 0.60 0.63 0.00 0.16 0.14 0.45 0.34 0.10 0.60 
19 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.97 0.09 0.11 0.34 0.48 0.02 0.02 
20 0.85 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.34 0.36 0.02 0.93 
21 0.02 0.08 0.91 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.99 0.96 0.36 
22 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.18 0.01 0.01 0.25 0.09 0.99 
23 0.88 0.00 1.00 0.71 0.52 0.02 0.02 0.46 0.08 0.99 
24 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.92 0.31 0.01 0.02 0.65 0.02 0.36 
25 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.29 1.00 0.97 0.96 1.00 0.96 1.00 
26 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.96 0.99 0.98 0.97 
27 0.00 0.20 0.06 0.00 0.44 0.34 0.34 0.75 0.33 0.01 
28 0.94 1.00 1.00 0.03 0.97 0.96 0.97 0.90 0.96 0.98 
29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.87 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.31 0.00 
30 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.83 0.92 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 1.00 
31 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.79 0.88 0.85 0.98 0.32 0.99 0.05 
32 0.91 0.00 0.94 - 0.92 0.94 1.00 0.94 0.94 0.91 
33 0.00 0.98 0.88 - 0.96 0.91 1.00 0.89 0.89 0.02 
34 0.00 0.99 0.60 0.33 0.65 0.02 0.90 0.20 0.04 0.54 
35 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.84 0.31 0.02 0.68 0.04 0.01 0.87 
36 0.12 0.89 0.88 0.81 0.92 0.88 0.99 0.90 0.90 0.20 
37 1.00 1.00 0.90 0.84 0.79 0.60 0.97 0.79 0.80 0.90 
38 0.93 1.00 0.86 0.77 0.64 0.07 0.68 0.53 0.04 0.08 
39 0.00 0.37 0.91 0.84 0.90 0.85 0.99 0.87 0.87 0.87 
40 0.93 1.00 1.00 0.78 0.96 0.84 1.00 0.89 0.88 0.85 






5.7.2. Evaluation using SWaT-2019 Dataset 
Table 7 presents the evaluation measures for the two proposed approaches with their 
one-path alternatives for the SWaT-2019 dataset. The IDS-MAN achieved the highest 
performance for precision, F1-score, accuracy, TNR, and fall behind the best recall by 
1%. The IDS-ITS with ENet comes in second place, followed by the IDS-ITS with CC. 
Generally, the models trained on one modality showed significantly lower performance 
compared to their counterparts.  
 
Table 7: Comparison Between the IDS-ITS and IDS-MAN for SWaT-2019 Dataset. 
Approach 
 
Precision Recall F1 Accuracy TNR 
IDS-ITS NP 0.242 0.515 0.329 0.573 0.588 
PP 0.208 0.372 0.267 0.584 0.638 
Add 0.248 0.630 0.356 0.538 0.514 
CC 0.441 0.607 0.511 0.764 0.804 
Enet 0.494 0.637 0.557 0.794 0.834 
PSA 0.355 0.804 0.493 0.684 0.656 
NSA 0.210 0.797 0.332 0.388 0.292 
IDS-MAN 0.648 0.794 0.714 0.878 0.898 
 
To analyze the recall values and understand the detection of the individual 
attacks that target different parts of the system, Figure 19 shows the individual 
accuracies of the normal samples, the instances of the exfiltrate historian data attack, 
the instances of disrupt sensor and actuator attack, and the overall accuracy. The PSA 
model detected the attacks that disrupt the sensors and actuators with an accuracy of 
87% compared to 45% for the network model and 61% for the IDS-MAN. For the 
attacks that exfiltrate the historian data, the network model obtained a high detection of 
98% compared to 77% for the process model and 89% for the IDS-MAN. On the other 
hand, the IDS-MAN classified 90% of normal instances with an increase of 24% and 




IDS-ITS, in which the NP model obtained an accuracy of 66% for the attacks that target 
the historian data while the PP model got an accuracy of 20%. On the contrary, the PP 
and NP models achieved accuracies of 71% and 21% for the attacks that target the 
process metrics.   
 
 
Figure 19: The classification accuracy of the individual sample types for the two 
approaches and their one-modality alternatives. 
 
5.8. Discussion 
5.8.1. IDS Performance 
The two proposed IDSs show different performances. As an overall result, the IDS-
ITS performed better with the SWaT-2015 dataset in terms of F1-score, recall, and 
precision. IDS-MAN achieved a higher accuracy; however, comparing accuracy for this 
scenario is misleading because with IDS-ITS, the data are balanced, while in IDS-
MAN, the data are imbalanced. Another important measure to consider when assessing 
the IDS performance is the TNR (specificity), which is not considered by the previous 
works. In this measure, the IDS-MAN scored the highest. For IDS, the value of the 
TNR should not be lower than the TPR (recall) value. Even though the goal of the IDS 
is to detect cyberattacks and achieve a high TPR, obtaining high TPR with the cost of 




rate is very critical for IDS in CPS because an action might be triggered to respond to 
the generated false alert, which may cause unnecessary disruption in the system. 
Accordingly, both TNR and TPR are equally important for IDS in CPS.  
From another perspective, the best-performed IDS-ITS with ENet, which 
outperforms the IDS-MAN and previous works in terms of F1-score, achieved a lower 
recall value compared to the IDS-MAN. By comparing these two models, we can 
observe that the IDS-MAN scored higher in terms of the TNR by 2.6% and TPR by 
3.7%. For the individual detection rates of the attacks, the IDS-MAN obtained a higher 
rate for 19 attacks compared to 16 attacks with the ENet IDS-ITS. Besides, the main 
advantage of the IDT-ITS is its ability to detect all the attack scenarios, which was not 
achieved by the IDS-MAN and the previous works. Detecting all the attacks is the top 
priority for IDSs. Even if the detection rates for some of the attacks are low, however, 
this will alert the operators, and further actions can be taken based on their assessment 
of the severity of the attack. 
5.8.2. Attacks Discoverability  
The intuition behind using different data sources is to increase the discoverability 
of the attacks and the performance of the IDS by capturing the correlations between the 
various attributes across the system. For the SWaT-2019 dataset, using data from two 
different modalities (process-level and network-level) clearly showed that the attacks’ 
discoverability is increased significantly compared to using only one data source. If one 
data source is used and the attack target is not monitored, some attacks can go 
undetected by the IDS. For example, for insider attackers with the intent of harming the 
physical process, a network IDS will have low discoverability for these kinds of attacks 
since the attack will not leave any footprints in the network traffic characteristics except 




challenge of dealing with unstructured data. Moreover, it does not eliminate the need 
to consider the process-level data because the packets’ payload may not reflect the 
actual system state. This owes to the fact that the payload can be spoofed to reflect 
misleading information about the state of the system. Since industrial protocols such as 
Modbus lack encryption, the attacker can know the target's normal range by observing 
the network traffic and changing the payload accordingly to reflect the normal operation 
of the system while causing actual harm to the system.  
Besides that, using only IDS at the physical process is also not sufficient since the 
IDS will not be aware of the cyber level of the system. For example, considering a DOS 
attack that does not target the physical process directly, the attack most likely will not 
be detected by process-level IDS until the attack is propagated and causing a major 
delay in the operation of the process. However, considering the network traffic can help 
detect these attacks at an early stage and take actions accordingly to avoid major 
disruptions in the operations of the physical process.  
5.8.3. Real-Time Operation 
The two proposed approaches have similar requirements for real-time 
implementation. Both IDS operates in real-time by reading the process-level metrics 
continuously every specified period (e.g., every 1 second). Then if network traffic is 
used, the data has to pass through the features extraction stage. After that, the data go 
through the pre-processing stage, which involves normalizing the coming data using 
either the mean and variance of the training data or the min and max values. These 
numbers need to be stored to be able to scale the newly arrived data. Since the window-
based approach is used, when the IDSs operate for the first time, they will wait for a 
period equal to the window size in order to be able to make the first prediction. After 




will be available for the IDSs to operate without delay by making a prediction at every 
slide of the window. For IDS-ITS, another pre-processing step is required, which is 
converting the data into images. Moreover, if the difference time-series is used, extra 
processing and memory are needed to calculate the differences between the current 
readings and their previous values and to scale the data.  
For efficiency, CNN is known to be faster than RNN because the RNN operates 
sequentially and has to keep a memory of the previous hidden states. However, since 
the input data dimension differs in the two approaches, this observation cannot be 
generalized. For the IDS-ITS, the image size plays a major role in the efficiency since 
smaller images size will have a much lower training and testing time. The image size 
in GAF is controlled by the PAA and is usually determined by the computation capacity 
or by tuning. Using PAA gives an advantage to the IDS-ITS because it can control the 
dimension of the input data using a well-established approach and implementation 
without further consideration. However, a drawback of using PAA is the pre-processing 




The two proposed IDSs have different advantages and disadvantages. First, in terms 
of complexity, the IDS-ITS requires more preprocessing steps to convert the input time-
series to images which will cause a delay in the prediction time. Moreover, the use of 
3D CNN increased the computational cost required to train and evaluate the IDS. On 
the other hand, for the IDS-MAN, the only required preprocessing step is the feature 
normalization. Also, the IDS uses GRU, which is known to be faster than other RNN 




architecture, both CNN and GRU have different hyperparameters. However, the tuning 
results showed that more layers are needed in the IDS-ITS with the two datasets. 
Therefore, we can conclude that the IDS-MAN is better in terms of the overall 
complexity.  
5.8.4.2. Generalizability 
Any IDS has to be generalizable to be able to apply it to different systems. A 
common drawback for supervised IDS is that attack scenarios have to exist prior to the 
deployment and the training of the IDS, which is not always the case in real-time 
systems. In this work, we take advantage of the availability of datasets that contain 
different attack scenarios to build our IDS. For the IDS-ITS, the dataset has to be 
balanced in order for the IDS not to have any bias towards the majority class. This 
means that to train the network, many attack scenarios have to be presented to the IDS. 
Typically, for any CPS dataset, the number of anomalies is much lower than the number 
of normal instances since the occurrences of anomalies are rare. For this reason, we 
used oversampling and undersampling for balancing the number of instances in the two 
classes. A major drawback of undersampling of the normal instances is that some of 
the characteristics of the normal behavior will be lost, which may affect the 
generalizability of the IDS at the testing time. For the IDS-MAN, the IDS is trained to 
enhance the generalizability of attack detection by measuring the distance to the class 
embedding representation rather than using binary classification. The learning of the 
embedding representation eliminates the need to balance the datasets since the 
embeddings are learned accumulatively from all the class samples, so there is no bias 
toward any specific class during training. Moreover, a major advantage of the IDS-
MAN is that it can be easily extended for semi-supervised and unsupervised training. 




higher similarity, a threshold for the normal behavior will be set using the training data, 
and the attack detection will be determined if the output from the network exceeds this 
threshold. 
5.8.4.3. Attack Detection 
The goal of any IDS is to detect all the attacks while maintaining a low FPR. For 
the SWaT-2015 dataset, the attack scenarios are not repeated, which means that the IDS 
is evaluated on attacks that are not seen in the training. This provides an indication that 
the proposed IDSs have good generalization for detecting unknown cyberattacks. In 
general, the IDS-ITS provided better attack detection since all the attack scenarios are 
detected. Moreover, in addition to its superiority in detecting attacks 13 and 14 that 
were not detected previously, the IDS-ITS showed a significant increase in recall values 
for some of the attacks compared to the previous works, e.g., attacks 3, 16, and 27. On 
the other hand, the IDS-MAN obtained lower FPR, but two attacks were not detected. 
For the SWaT-2019 dataset, both IDS detected the two attack scenarios, with IDS-
MAN taking the lead by 15%. Therefore, in terms of attack detection, both IDSs showed 
superior performance with one of the datasets while obtaining good performance with 
the other.   
5.8.5. Classification Output 
In the training of the two proposed IDS, the overall performance was mainly 
assessed based on the F1-score which provide a balance between the precision and 
recall. However, in some cases, optimizing a specific evaluation measure is of more 
interest. For example, since the impacts of cyberattacks on CPS can be very harmful, a 
high recall value might be more desirable than the overall F1-score to minimize the 
number of attacks that can go undetected by the IDS. In this case, the IDS has to be 




supervised learning is used, the IDS can be trained to give more weight to the attack’s 
samples by providing a higher penalty for their misclassification. Hence the network 
would focus on reducing the errors for this class. Another solution is to increase the 
number of samples either by collecting new data or by oversampling. So, by having 
more attack samples, a slight bias would be introduced towards the attack class, and 
higher recall value will be obtained. On the other hand, if the distance-based 
classification in IDS-MAN is replaced by a threshold for the normal behavior, the recall 
can be increased by decreasing the threshold that determines how far the prediction 




CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
Protecting CPS from cyberattacks has been a priority due to the catastrophic 
consequences that such attacks can cause. In this thesis, we report the design, 
implementation, and evaluation of two intrusion detection systems (IDS) based on deep 
learning and multimodal techniques to detect cyberattacks on the process and network 
layers of CPS without the need to have a deep understanding of the underlying process. 
In the first IDS, named IDS-ITS, we used Gramian Angular Field to convert CPS time 
series data into images to be used for training a CNN classifier for detecting attacks. 
The evaluation results of the proposed approach demonstrated better detection 
accuracy, and more attacks were discovered. The second IDS, named IDS-MAN, used 
multimodal attention techniques for enhanced learning of joint representation between 
multiple modalities in CPS by focusing on the most important features in the system. 
Moreover, we explore different merging techniques to combine the different inputs. 
The main advantage of using multimodal fusion techniques is to capture the cross-
modal correlation. The proposed models were evaluated using two datasets. The first 
dataset contains only process-level data, while the second contains data from the 
process and network levels.  
In the IDS-ITS, the two multimodal merging techniques, which are Compact 
Bilinear Pooling (CBP) and EmbraceNet (ENet), achieved significant improvement 
compared to the simple merge techniques. Similarly, in IDS-MAN, the model showed 
a performance degradation when the multimodal attention layer is replaced by simple 
merge techniques. Moreover, the results showed that considering different data sources 
across the CPS for the IDS can boost the performance and the effectiveness of the 
attacks’ discoverability and the overall IDS accuracy. The findings of the thesis could 




answer the first research question by using different multimodal merge techniques to 
show how these techniques can be adopted for building two completely different IDSs 
for CPS.  For the second research question, the IDS-ITS showed that the multimodal 
merge techniques provided better detection capability compared to the other 
techniques. Moreover, both IDSs showed a considerable enhancement in the 
performance of the IDS that considered different modalities compared to the IDS that 
only used data collected at one CPS layer.  
For future work, we will consider the use of dimensionality reduction 
techniques to enhance the efficiency as well as the performance of the IDS since some 
attributes may not be significant for the classification, which may lead to a negative 
impact on the IDS performance. These techniques are especially needed for the network 
features since the network traffic data are not structured, and many features can be 
extracted considering the different protocols and the huge amount of data collected at 
each second. Moreover, we will apply further hyper-parameters optimization to boost 
the classifier performance and evaluate IDSs using other datasets and testbeds. Another 
future research direction is to consider the techniques of imaging time series and 
multimodal attention for semi-supervised and unsupervised learning by considering 
other types of neural networks such as autoencoders and generative adversarial 
networks to enhance the generalizability of the IDS. The IDS-MAN can be extended to 
semi-supervised learning by clustering the unlabeled samples based on their distance to 
the embedding representations. Also, it can be modified for unsupervised learning by 
training the network on the normal samples only and setting a threshold to detect the 
deviations from the system's normal behavior.  
One of the limitations of our work is that the proposed IDSs are not tested with 




mainly due to the lack of datasets that capture such scenarios. Hence, we were not able 
to perform such evaluation. For future work, we are considering the construction of a 
multiclass multimodal dataset that includes different attacks and normal scenarios with 
data captured from different layers by using a CPS testbed. For the normal scenarios, 
natural disturbances and malfunction scenarios will be included to have a richer dataset 
that reflects the real-time operation scenarios in CPS. For the attack scenarios, several 
attack types that target different layers of the CPS will be implemented. The attacks 
will include the known attacks such as Denial of Service (DOS) and ARP spoofing. In 
addition, more specific attacks for the used industrial protocol and the process will be 
considered, such as change the function code of the Modbus packet or tamper a specific 
sensor/actuator value in the process. The dataset will include data from the different 
CPS layers, including the physical process, the network traffic, and the hosts such as 
the PLCs and HMIs. This will enable enhancing the proposed IDS to distinguish 
between the abnormal behaviors that could occur due to disturbances in the process or 
malfunction in the system and the malicious attack scenarios. Also, the IDS can be 
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